Gratuitous Evil and the Sovereignty of God

By Stephen Mitchell

INTRODUCTION

“Gratuitous Evil” is defined simply as pointless evil, evil that does not accomplish or allow for a greater good. Rowe described the concept, “[t]here exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (Rowe, 336). Rowe’s understanding has become the standard way of describing gratuitous evil. For example, Coley defines it as “any evil that does not in some way lead to a greater good or prevent some worse evil” (Coley, 48). Assuming that God would not allow such brings up the question, if gratuitous evil does exist, does it contradict the doctrine of God’s sovereignty? In other words, as Hume noted of God, “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent” (Hume, n.p.) This paper will attempt to answer this question.

GRATUITOUS EVIL AND THE NONTHEIST

The nontheist has traditionally regarded evil as proof against the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. Mackie, for example, in a discussion of the free-will solution to the problem of evil, noted “. . . if men’s wills are really free this must mean that even God cannot control them, that is, that God is no longer omnipotent” (Mackie, 209-210). For the nontheist, “[a]n omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (Rowe, 336). But, in the case of most intense suffering, especially among the innocent, can there be shown a subsequent greater good that obtained from the suffering or a greater evil that was prevented? The nontheist says “No!” For the nontheist, the existence of evil and, argued more recently, gratuitous evil, provides a strong argument against the existence of a supreme being who is both wholly good and omnipotent. Rowe put it clearly when he wrote:

“It seems quite unlikely that all the instances of intense suffering occurring daily in our world are intimately related to the occurrence of greater goods or the prevention of evils at least as bad; and even more unlikely, should they somehow all be so related, than an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have achieved at least some of those goods (or prevented some of those evils) without permitting the instances of intense suffering that are supposedly related to them. In the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief” (337-338).

And Hume would find himself in agreement with Rowe.

“But there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone” (Hume, n.p.)

All agree that one cannot see most of the greater good that theists frequently insist upon. To the nontheist, evil in general brings about very little, if any, good in this world. The apparent gratuitousness of evil belies either the omnibenevolence, or the omnipotence, or the very existence of God for the nontheist.

GRATUITOUS EVIL AND THE THEIST

The theist, to some extent, has agreed with the nontheist that gratuitous evil does deny the omnipotence and/or omnibenevolence of God. To overcome the objection, the theist has traditionally held to the position that gratuitous evil does not exist.

“Central to the ‘Greater-Good’ theodicy is the denial of gratuitous evil. It maintains that God is justified in permitting only that evil which will bring about a greater good or prevent an evil equally bad or worse. Such a premise has been accepted by the vast majority of Christian philosophers throughout the history of Christendom and has been used as a means to defend a position of classical theism against the problem of evil” (Brubaker, 65).

Geisler and Bocchino insisted, “[o]ur not knowing all of the good purposes God has for pain and suffering doesn’t mean that there are no good purposes” (239). Groothuis wrote, “[a]ll evils serve some justifiable purpose in God’s economy” (638). Gerstner also accepted that evil is not without a good purpose. “Much that we call evil only appears to be so because our finite judgment lacks perspective. But even real evil may frequently, perhaps always, be of benefit to ourselves and others” (20). Swinburne concluded “that it follows from the Principle of Credulity that bad states for which no greater-good defence (sic) can apparently be provided must count against the existence of God” (29).
So, for the nontheist, the omnipotent, omnibenevolent God is denied based on gratuitous evil and, for most theists, gratuitous evil is denied based on the omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. Both agree that God’s nature is incompatible with gratuitous evil.
But, as Brubaker has suggested:

“Perhaps theists have been defending the existence of God from the wrong angle. Instead of denying gratuitous suffering and postulating the greater good stemming from every evil, the more consistent and logical approach may very well be to accept the reality of gratuitous evil and then to attempt to prove that such evil does not count against the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good Being” (71).

His point is well taken.

GRATUITOUS EVIL AND GOD

For the Christian theist, a discussion of the existence of gratuitous evil must begin with the revelation of God. Do the Scriptures present the Christian with any instances of gratuitous evil?
In Jer 7.31 God states, “They have built the high places of Topheth, which is in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire, which I did not command, and it did not come into My mind.” This last phrase was repeated with the same context in Jer 19.5 and 32.35. In what sense did God say “it did not come into My mind?” It cannot be that He was surprised at it as He warned them against this very practice in Lev 18.21 and warned Israel what He would do to anyone who practiced such evil in Lev 20.2-5. Instead, “God disclaims any connection with this hideous practice” (Feinberg, 77). Now if God is disclaiming any connection with this infant sacrifice, then surely that would be an evil about which God had no plans other than the judgment He described in Jer 7.32-34 and 19.6-13. It would seem to fit the description of a gratuitous evil, one which occurred without preventing a worse evil or bringing about a greater good.
Additional passages one might consider are Genesis 6.5-7 and 11-12. There God said of the earth that it was totally corrupt, filled with violence, and that the wickedness of man was an expression of the evil intention of every thought of his heart. The fact that God was sorry He had made man and grieved, determined to completely annihilate man and animal except for the few in the ark, would lend support to the rampant evil being unable to produce a greater good or prevent a greater evil. All God could do was wipe them out and start over.

“Verse 12 intentionally recalls v. 5, where ‘the LORD saw’ the intensity of human evil (‘every,’ ‘all’), and 1:31, where ‘the LORD saw’ the ‘good’ earth he had made. Here ‘God saw’ that the ‘good’ earth was now corrupt, and the corruption was all-inclusive (‘all people’), excepting Noah. For this reason ‘only Noah was left’ from the earth (7:23). The burden of guilt rests with man, although the earth and all its creatures suffer with him. ‘Their ways’ reiterates that sin is not an isolated event here or there: corruption pervades the lifestyle of the antediluvian population. They are corrupt to the cultural core” (Matthews, 360).

The passages considered appear to show that gratuitous evil is a reality. Now it would also appear to be true that there could be a good brought about from these instances that is beyond our human understanding. As Geisler stated, “God knows a good purpose for all evil, even if we do not. Simply because finite minds cannot conceive of a good purpose for some evil does not mean that there is none” (Geisler, 222). But if this were true it would be reasonable to expect that God would have explained someplace in His revelation that He has a good purpose for every evil since, for almost all evil, man cannot see the good. Yet, God never declared this in Scripture. He does state that He overcomes the evil intent in some circumstances but these are not given to us in such a way as to conclude that He planned the evil to occur in order to bring about the good.

CONCLUSION

So, if gratuitous evil does exist, what does it imply about the sovereignty of God? Does it mean that God is unable to control His creation? Again, one must answer by looking to the Scriptures.
The Scriptures are emphatic that God’s sovereignty is not in any way curtailed. His power and decisions cannot be thwarted or changed.

Thus says the LORD, your Redeemer, and the one who formed you from the womb, “I, the LORD, am the maker of all things, stretching out the heavens by Myself and spreading out the earth all alone, causing the omens of boasters to fail, making fools out of diviners, causing wise men to draw back and turning their knowledge into foolishness, confirming the word of His servant and performing the purpose of His messengers” (Isa 44.24‑26a).

And again, “I am God. Even from eternity I am He, And there is none who can deliver out of My hand; I act and who can reverse it?” (Isa 43.12b-13). Or, as Nebuchadnezzar stated after God released him from his boanthropy:
All the inhabitants of the earth are accounted as nothing, But He does according to His will in the host of heaven And among the inhabitants of earth; And no one can ward off His hand Or say to Him, ‘What have You done?‘ (Dan 4.35).

That God’s sovereignty and power is absolute is seen in His destruction of the earth with the flood, the partings of the Red Sea and the Jordan for Israel, the provision of manna and clothes that did not wear out, His calling Cyrus to do His will 150 years before Cyrus’ reign, the fear of obedient Jehoshaphat by the surrounding nations and so many other events in Scripture. But if God is so sovereignly in control of all things, how can gratuitous evil exist?
Understanding the answer to this question must begin with understanding the nature of the actions by God’s created free moral agents. God gave His moral agents free will, freedom of choice in their actions.

“[W]hen we use the term ‘free will’ we mean what is called libertarian freedom: Given choices A and B, one can literally choose to do either one, no circumstances exist that are sufficient to determine one’s choice; a person’s choice is up to him, and if he does one of them, he could have done otherwise, or at least he could have refrained from acting at all” (Moreland and Craig, 240)

God created man as a free moral agent able to make free choices. This freedom meant freedom to choose to do good but also freedom to choose to do evil.

“Now God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren’t significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so” (Plantinga, 30)

God made man perfect and without fault and placed him in a perfectly good creation without any defect of any kind. But God also gave man freedom of choice with the option of obeying God or disobeying Him. In giving this freedom to man God also gave man a test, a choice to do good or evil. Man chose to do evil. “Because he was over creation, all creation felt the consequences of sin. From this flows (either directly or indirectly) all suffering and pain in this world” (Little, 45). “Because man was lord over creation, when man fell, it affected all of creation and this explains natural evil (Ro. 8:22)” (Ibid., 47).
In order to restrain or limit the amount of evil in this world, God initially provided for man a moral sense of right and wrong, written on his heart (Rom 2.14-15), along with knowledge of God Himself through nature (Rom 1.19-20). Then God later added the written revelation of Himself (Heb 1.1), followed by coming to earth in person to show us His character (Joh 14.8-9). Rather than violating the freedom of choice He gave man, God has labored to persuade man to turn to God and forsake man’s evil. For example, when God spoke to Cain about his hatred of his brother, Abel, God could have simply stopped him, but instead, God worked to persuade him to choose what is right and to warn him of the consequences (Gen 4.3-12). Another example is God’s dealings with Israel. “God’s respect for His unfaithful bride, Israel (seen in Hosea and other prophetic writings), pleading with her to return, is a far more obvious and repeated expression of God’s way of dealing with His sinful creation” (Middelman, 64). Rather than God forcing Israel’s obedience and worship, God pleads for it. So, in one way, God restrains evil by pleading with man for the good.
But what if man does not listen? God has given man himself the responsibility of restraining the evil of those who refuse to listen and obey God. We see this in His institution of human government. As Paul wrote in Rom 13.3‑4:

“For rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to have no fear of authority? Do what is good and you will have praise from the same; for it is a minister of God to you for good. But if you do what is evil, be afraid; for it does not bear the sword for nothing; for it is a minister of God, an avenger who brings wrath on the one who practices evil.“

God gave man knowledge of right and wrong so man could restrain himself, and God gave human government the responsibility of restraining those who refuse to restrain themselves. The net effect is that man will suffer the effects of evil that man himself allows. This system admits the occurrence of gratuitous evil.

“God has not obligated Himself either by promise or covenantal word to bring ‘good’ out of evil—He has only promised to redeem men from evil (Gen. 3:15). However, at certain points and under certain circumstances God can (and has), when it is consistent with His character and purpose intervened in the affairs of men because of His goodness, in answer to the prayer of His people, or because of His grace. Some evil in this world is without purpose and God is under no obligation to do anything with it except condemn it. God’s commandments are designed to diminish the amount of evil in this world, so it is not so much that man should expect God to bring ‘good’ from evil, but that man should refrain from doing evil. God may, for His own good reasons, bring some good from some evil, but it is not as an explanation for why the evil occurred—the ‘good’ most often is in spite of the evil” (Little, 47).

God’s sovereignty is seen in the times He steps into history to overcome evil with good, to render judgment upon the wicked, to answer the prayers of His people, and in His actions guiding the world to fulfill His ultimate plan for history. God has informed man that judgment is coming (Gen 2.16-17 and Heb 9.27). What man does in response to His warning is on man’s shoulders alone. God is without fault or blame. God will ultimately accomplish His good purposes (2Pet 2.9-10). But, in the meantime:

“Let the one who does wrong, still do wrong; and the one who is filthy, still be filthy; and let the one who is righteous, still practice righteousness; and the one who is holy, still keep himself holy. ‘Behold, I am coming quickly, and My reward is with Me, to render to every man according to what he has done. I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end.’ Blessed are those who wash their robes, so that they may have the right to the tree of life, and may enter by the gates into the city. Outside are the dogs and the sorcerers and the immoral persons and the murderers and the idolaters, and everyone who loves and practices lying” (Rev 22.11-15).

So the answer to the question is: the existence of gratuitous evil does not contradict the sovereignty of God.

Bibliography

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